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In the concept papers Operational Maneuver From the Sea, (OMFTS), Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver (STOM), Sea-Based Logistics (SBL), and Maritime Prepositioning 
Force (MPF) 2010 and Beyond, the Marine Corps laid out its vision of how it will 
conduct future amphibious warfare.  Under OMFTS, combat forces will be deployed 
from the sea base directly to an objective ashore.  This approach drastically reduces or 
eliminates logistics infrastructure ashore and retains these capabilities at the sea base.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to date regarding future STOM requirements of 
moving forces, equipment, and supplies ashore; however, minimal effort has been exerted 
thus far in resolving the issue of sustaining the continuously-depleted resources of the sea 
base.  
This thesis compares possible alternatives for resupplying the Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare (EMW) Sea Base (SB).  Different scenarios are analyzed for how well 
each prospective resupply alternative is able to maintain required levels of food, fuel, and 
ordnance at the sea base with varying distances from the Forward Logistics Site (FLS).  
The scenarios differ by distances between the sea base and FLS, varying consumption 
rates at the sea base, and different shuttle ship alternatives.  Sustainment requirements 
and sea base safety stock levels are determined and compared for twelve different 
scenarios.  This analysis provides insight into the type, number, and capacity of resupply 
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In the concept papers Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver (STOM), Sea-Based Logistics (SBL), and Maritime Prepositioning 
Force (MPF) 2010 and Beyond, the Marine Corps laid out its vision of how it will 
conduct future amphibious warfare.  Under OMFTS, combat forces will be deployed 
from the sea base directly to an objective ashore.  This approach drastically reduces or 
eliminates logistics infrastructure ashore and retains these capabilities at the sea base.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to date regarding future STOM requirements of 
moving forces, equipment, and supplies ashore; however, minimal effort has been exerted 
thus far in resolving the issue of sustaining the continuously-depleted resources of the sea 
base.  
The Marine Corps plans to indefinitely sustain combat forces from the supplies 
and equipment onboard the ships of an Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 
(MPSRON) composed of Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ships.  The 
MPSRON is equipped to logistically support a MEB-sized force for a period of 
approximately 30 days.  Considering this initial level of inventory, 15 days of supply 
(DOS) safety stock level dictates a maximum of 15 days of operations supported from the 
sea base prior to going below the reserve inventory level.  If operations continue for 
greater than 15 days, replenishment of the sea base will be required prior to the fifteenth 
day.  The lack of a replenishment system could force the withdrawal of forces prior to 
mission accomplishment. 
In order for the MPSRON to provide indefinite sustainment, ships will either need 
to rotate off-station for replenishment or be resupplied on-station on a recurring basis.  
The flow of resupply consumables from the Forward Logistics Site (FLS) to the sea base 
is a significant challenge.  This thesis compares two possible shuttle ship alternatives for 
resupplying a sea base that is providing logistics support for a MEB-sized force.  The 
alternatives are (1) T-AKE (Auxiliary Dry Cargo Replenishment Ship) and T-AO 
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(Auxiliary Fleet Oiler) combination, and (2) MPF(F) variants with a capacity based upon 
current MPF ship capacities.   
Twelve cases drawn from three different geographic scenarios are analyzed with 
respect to each sustainment alternative’s ability to maintain required levels of 
subsistence, fuel, and ordnance at the sea base.  The scenarios differ by distances between 
the sea base and FLS.  Additionally, the analysis considers two consumption rates at the 
sea base and two shuttle ship alternatives.  Sustainment requirements and sea base safety 
stock levels are thus determined and compared for twelve different cases.  The scenarios 
are analyzed to investigate the feasibility of each possible alternative in meeting resupply 
requirements and the number of each ship required to maintain sea base commodity 
inventories above safety stock levels.  This thesis provides an initial look at the analysis 
required to compare these or any other future alternatives.   
Results of the analysis indicate that, except for the shortest distance between the 
FLS and the sea base, two MPF variant shuttles or the combination of three T-AKEs and 
one T-AO are required to keep sea base commodity inventories above inventory safety 
stock levels.  Ordnance stocks are the driving factor. 
Even while the resupply system of two MPF variant shuttles is able to maintain 
long-term sustainment in most cases with minimal difficulty, inventory problems exist 
primarily after the shuttle ships have offloaded their initial three-day sustainment supply 
at the sea base and transit to the FLS for the first resupply evolution.  In four of the six 
cases involving the MPF variant, inventories of one or more commodities drop below the 
10-DOS level, and one of the remaining two cases drops below 15-DOS.    
While the combination of two-T-AKEs and one T-AO is able to sustain food and 
fuel with minimal difficulty in most scenarios, analysis determines that three T-AKEs 
and one T-AO are required to maintain ammunition expenditure rates in the most difficult 
cases.  
The large capacity of the MPF shuttle results is a superior cargo handling 
advantage over the T-AKE/T-AO combination.  The ability to receive twenty-foot 
containers at the FLS coupled with the increased size enable the MPF shuttle to onload 
 xix 
three times the dry cargo of the T-AKE in one-third less time.  Considering assumed FLS 
load rates, the T-AKE will take three days to completely reload with palletized cargo, 
while the MPF shuttle will depart the FLS fully loaded in only two days.   
Subject to the ability to procure MPF shuttle variants of sufficient size and 
capacity, the MPF shuttle alternative may be the more attractive of the two possibilities 
considered.  Cost factors were not applied, as only operational capabilities were 
considered in this analysis.   
The overall results of this thesis are intended to serve as an entering argument for 
discussions by Navy and Marine Corps planners regarding resupply of the sea base, as 




























A. OMFTS CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Concepts Division 
formed its vision for fighting future expeditionary campaigns in its United States Marine 
Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century [Ref 1].  In the follow-on concept 
papers Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 
(STOM), Sea-Based Logistics (SBL), and Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) 2010 
and Beyond, the Marine Corps detailed how it foresaw the conduct of future amphibious 
operations.  Under OMFTS, combat forces of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) will be deployed from the sea base directly to an objective ashore.  By using 
the sea as a maneuvering space instead of using a single point of assault, Marines will be 
able to strategically insert combat forces, rapidly collect and process intelligence data, 
and take decisive action before the enemy can react [Ref 2].  Forces operating ashore will 
maintain minimal inventory levels, relying instead on frequent support from the sea base.  
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver implements OMFTS at the tactical level and 
provides for the rapid projection of Marine Corps units ashore while maintaining 
command and control, fire support and logistics support at the sea base.  Using Landing 
Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC), Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAVs), and 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft, troops and supporting equipment will be 
moved and sustained ashore.  Landing forces will no longer be required to make a 
massive assault in landing craft to secure the beach area for follow-on support forces to 
catch up.  Instead, Marine Corps units will generate and maintain a high-tempo operation 
and overwhelm enemy units with continued power, surprise, and swift maneuvers [Ref 
3]. 
Sea-Based Logistics [Ref 4] is the prime enabling concept that will make STOM 
possible.  SBL uses Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) and Maritime Prepositioning 
Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ships to provide a sea base from which combat forces ashore are 
sustained.  Traditionally, amphibious landings have been supported from supply 
inventories established ashore in the early stages of an assault.  Rather than building a 
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large logistics stockpile ashore, SBL uses over-the-horizon delivery vehicles to provide a 
more adaptable and secure replenishment option for the landing force.  By maintaining 
essentially all logistics functions and inventory onboard the ships of the sea base, the 
logistics footprint ashore can be drastically reduced, or even eliminated, while creating a 
combat service support infrastructure that is much more responsive to the requirements of 
the landing force commanders.  SBL will not be tied to basing rights issues or host nation 
support.  The sea base will essentially serve as a primary distribution center with the 
capability to transship cargo and distribute ready-for- issue materiel cargo for distribution 
to forces ashore. 
MPF 2010 and Beyond describes the four pillars of future MPF operations: force 
closure, amphibious task force integration, indefinite sustainment, and reconstitution and 
redeployment.  A key enabler of SBL is the indefinite sustainment requirement of 
MPF(F).  Logistics support will flow from bases and support facilities located in the U.S. 
or overseas, via the sea base provided by MPF 2010 and Beyond, then on to Marine units 
conducting operations ashore or at sea [Ref 5].  This sea-based logistics effort could 
include not only MPF and ARG ships, but also aviation logistics support ships, hospital 
ships, and offshore petroleum distribution system (OPDS) ships. 
In addition to the pillars of MPF(F), this concept paper also details the required 
triad of operational capabilities: fast deployment, reinforcement, and sustained sea-
basing.  The sustained sea-basing capability will furnish a full range of logistics support, 
as well as the conduit to strategic bases through which MPF 2010 and Beyond will 
provide indefinite sustainment for a MAGTF [Ref 5].  Unlike current MPF operations 
where ships will conduct a complete offload of equipment and supplies in a benign 
environment and then depart the area, ships of the future sea base will remain on station 
providing on-demand logistics support and selective offload capabilities, extensive 
medical and intermediate repair facilities, and advanced command and control features.  
Selective offload, the rapid retrieval and distribution of essential items from sea-based 




B. THE NEED FOR RESUPPLY 
The Marine Corps plans to indefinitely sustain combat forces from the supplies 
and equipment onboard the ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 
(MPSRON).  The MPSRON is equipped to logistically support a MEB-sized force for a 
period of approximately 30 days.  Considering this initial level of inventory, a 15 DOS 
safety stock level (safety stock levels will be discussed in detail in Chapter III) dictates a 
maximum of 15 days of operations supported from the sea base prior to going below the 
reserve inventory level.  If operations continue for greater than 15 days, replenishment of 
the sea base will be required prior to the fifteenth day.  The lack of a replenishment 
system will possibly force the withdrawal of forces prior to mission accomplishment. 
In order for the MPSRON to provide indefinite sustainment, ships will either need 
to rotate off-station for replenishment or be resupplied on-station on a recurring basis.  If 
ships were required to rotate off station to be resupplied, this would result in fewer ships 
available at the sea base to support Marines ashore.  Ships that are required to depart the 
sea base take with them much needed equipment, as well as command and control, 
medical, and intermediate- level repair facilities.  This logically leads to the need for a 
system to resupply the ships of the sea base on-station to prevent the ships from having to 
rotate off station for sustainment. 
 
C. CURRENT RESUPPLY OPTIONS 
As the Navy and Marine Corps embark on the journey towards OMFTS, no 
current system exists that is able to resupply Marine Corps provisions, fuel and 
ammunition.  The current Navy operational logistics system is not equipped to support 
the Marine Corps. 
The Navy’s Combat Logistics Force (CLF) is a very capable asset that enables 
sustained naval presence and aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) operations anywhere in 
the world; however, there are simply not enough available ships or space for Marine 
Corps sustainment requirements. 
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Modular Cargo Discharge System (MCDS) ships could be considered a 
possibility; however, there are some major problems with the current platforms.  Ships 
with the MCDS system currently installed are approximately 40 years old already and 
will be at least ten years older by the time sea basing becomes a reality.  Additionally, the 
ships are only capable of breakbulk cargo.  The term “breakbulk” refers to ships 
characterized by large open hatches and fitted with boom-and-winch gear or deck cranes 
[Ref 6].  These ships may retain some usefulness with odd-shaped cargos; however, in 
direct comparison with container-capable ships, breakbulk ships are no longer 
commercially viable.  Whereas the complete loadout of an auxiliary ammunition ship (T-
AE) takes only two days using palletized cargo loads, a breakbulk ship may take up to 
fourteen days for an equivalent amount of cargo.  An additional item of concern for the  
MCDS ships is the recurring difficulty of manning the nation’s Ready Reserve Force 
(RRF) ships, which MCDS is part of the inventory.  RRF ships remain ready to serve 
within a few days notice; however, they do not retain a permanent crew.  As the 
Baltimore Sun reported in September 2001, the shortage of qualified sailors to man our 
RRF fleet is a significant issue, and in their words, “a threat to national security” [Ref 7].  
The MCDS system may be sufficient for occasional supplementary assistance to the CLF, 
but its deficiencies in capability and reliability prevent it from being a serious 
consideration for the sea base resupply system. 
 
D. SEA BASE SUSTAINMENT SYSTEM 
Based upon the absence of any current system capable of handling sea base 
resupply, the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) sea base must have its own 
sustainment system.  The system must be capable of resupplying ships of the sea base on-
station and in a timely manner.  This thesis presents two possible alternatives for 
resupplying the sea base and provides an initial look at the analysis required to compare 
these or any other future alternatives.  The alternatives are (1) a T-AKE (Auxiliary Dry 
Cargo Replenishment Ship) and T-AO (Auxiliary Fleet Oiler) combination, and (2) an 
MPF(F) variant with a capacity based upon current MPF ship capacities. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTORY-TO-FOXHOLE LOGISTICS NETWORK 
For any sustained expeditionary operation, there is an immediate requirement to 
establish a resupply system for Marine Corps fuel, ordnance, and stores.  There must be 
the capability to move sustainment supplies to an MPSRON prior to initial MPF(F) 
inventories being decremented to the theater safety stock level. 
To properly represent the overall process of maintaining the Marines in an 
expeditionary environment, the sustainment system should be viewed as a network with a 
required amount of throughput based upon demand at the sea base.  The best way to 
understand this throughput is to define all of the necessary steps in the logistics flow. 
MPF ships will be indefinitely sustained from sources outside theater, most likely 
the continental United States (CONUS).  Consumables, including provisions, 
ammunition, and fuel, as well as other supply requirements, such as spare parts and 
replacement vehicles, will be delivered to the sea base as part of the logistics flow.  As 
sustainment supplies transit from the factory to the foxhole, there are four natural 
transitions in the supply network: 
(1) From the depot/factory to a CONUS port for shipment overseas onboard 
commercial ships; 
(2) From a CONUS port to a Forward Logistics Site (FLS) in-theater; 
(3) From the FLS to the ships of the sea base; and 
(4) From the sea base to Marine Corps combat forces operating ashore. 






Figure 1.   Factory-to-Foxhole Logistics.  
 
Responsibility for the transportation of these supplies differs with the location.  
The factory to CONUS port and CONUS port to the FLS phases of the network are the 
responsibility of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).  Marine Corps 
fuel resupply will arrive in-theater at the FLS by merchant tankers.  Marine Corps 
ordnance and stores resupply will arrive in- theater by commercial container ships. 
The FLS to sea base phase of the network, on the other hand, would become the 
responsibility of the Navy and Marine Corps and would be characterized by a port with 
the facilities to offload commercial container ships and on- load sea base shuttle ships.  
Once the commercial ship arrives at the FLS, sustainment cargo will either be offloaded 
to a holding facility or directly transferred to a sea base resupply shuttle ship.  If the 
shuttle ship cannot receive and handle containers, they will be unstuffed and palletized 
cargo will be onloaded for sea base resupply.   
The last phase of the logistics network, sea base to Marine forces ashore, is the 















Forces AshoreSea Base Ship
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completed thus far regarding this phase of OMFTS [Ref 8 through 13].  These studies 
have determined sustainment requirements, delivery vehicle requirements, and 
replenishment time requirements for the logistics flow to forces ashore.  The overlapping 
points of interest for this thesis are the overall sea base sustainment requirements that are 
required to maintain maximum force readiness.  These sustainment requirements are the 
entering argument for the FLS to sea base phase. 
 
B. CONTAINER JUSTIFICATION AND HANDLING 
A major aspect of the sea basing system will be the integration of containers into 
the logistics flow to resupply the sea base.  It is assumed that future sustainment ordnance 
and stores will be transported from the continental United States in twenty-foot 
intermodal containers or USMC QUADCONs (four connected QUADCONs are handled 
like a twenty foot container) via commercial container ships of various sizes.  In the sea 
base logistics flow, containers will be loaded at the manufacturers’ facilities or a military 
supply depot, transported to a port of embarkation, and loaded onboard a container ship 
which will transit directly to the theater of operations.  Modern container ships range in 
capacity from 1500 to 6000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units).   
Containerization of cargo in the logistics flow to the sea base would provide 
significant attributes within the sustainment system.  Increased utilization of containers 
would: 
(1) Prevent the numerous occurrences of material re-handling that exist in the 
current system.  Each time that equipment or supplies are unloaded and subsequently 
reloaded, logistics manpower and resources are expended and material loss or damage 
can occur; 
(2) Provide greater levels of physical security for the equipment being shipped. 
Materials stored in containers do not require extensive warehouse facilities to provide 
security and protection from the weather as palletized or bulk cargo does; and 
8 
(3) Provide for more efficient loading and offloading evolutions for the resupply 
ships.  This enables the resupply ship, the revenue maker for the logistics system, to 
return to sea and back to the sea base quicker for an overall faster turnaround time. 
An issue to be analyzed is the point in the resupply network to which containers 
will flow towards Marine Corps forces ashore.  Opinions at a recent Sea Base 
Sustainment Conference with Navy and Marine Corps representatives differ on whether 
containers should be delivered all the way to the MPF(F) ships of the sea base or 
delivered to the FLS where the containers would be unstuffed so that palletized cargo can 
then be delivered to the sea base.  Engineers at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port 
Hueneme Division, Underway Replenishment (UNREP) Department are currently 
designing an Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) Heavy UNREP system which is required 
under the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program.  This system, which will be 
developed and demonstrated by FY 2005, will essentially double the existing UNREP 
capacity from 5,700 lbs to 12,000 lbs.  However, transfer of containers weighing up to 
50,000 pounds would represent an eight-fold increase in current UNREP capabilities.  
The MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) are 
still under development; thus, it has not been determined if an MPF(F) operational 
requirement is the ability to receive twenty-foot containers at sea while underway.  If so, 
this would drive technological developments more quickly in that direction.   
At the present time, transfer of twenty-foot containers at-sea is not technologically 
feasible and will not be considered in this thesis.  It is assumed that connected cargo 
transfer at the sea base will be limited to the 12,000 lb Heavy UNREP system. 
Despite the fact that at-sea container transfer will not play a part in this analysis, it 
may be prudent to consider a shuttle ship with container receiving and handling 
capabilities in the case that container transfer at sea does become a reality for future sea 





C. FORWARD LOGISTICS SITE (FLS) 
The Forward Logistics Site (FLS) will serve as a transshipment point between the 
commercial container and tanker ships and the sea base resupply shuttle.  Modern 
container ships do not have cargo-handling gear and must rely upon ports with container 
cranes.  The FLS would possess the ability to berth and offload commercial shipping and 
take on whatever capabilities will be required in order to ensure the safe and efficient 
flow of supplies to the sea base.   
Possible alternatives for the FLS could be: 
(1) a modern container port;  
(2) an unimproved port with pier facilities but no container handling capability; or 
(3) a naturally protected bay or harbor where no pier facilities exist. 
For alternatives (2) and (3) above, sufficient naval support equipment would need 
to be brought into the FLS to facilitate container handling and stowage.  This may consist 
of crane ships, barges, tugs and lighterage.  The specific FLS location and distance from 
the sea base would be dependent on various tactical and strategic concerns.  Examples of 
these concerns would be the availability of friendly host nation ports, airfields and the 
security of the logistic transportation and intermodal assets being employed.   
 
D. FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY 
The flow of resupply consumables from the FLS to the sea base is a significant 
challenge.  Without a satisfactory resolution to the problem, OMFTS has no chance of 
success.  This thesis compares two possible shuttle ship alternatives for resupplying a sea 
base that is providing logistics support for a MEB-sized force.  The alternatives are (1) a 
T-AKE (Auxiliary Dry Cargo Replenishment Ship) and T-AO (Auxiliary Fleet Oiler) 
combination, and (2) an MPF(F) variant with a capacity based upon current MPF ship 
capacities.   
Three different scenarios are analyzed with respect to each sustainment 
alternative’s ability to maintain required levels of subsistence, fuel, and ordnance at the 
sea base.  The scenarios differ by distances between the sea base and FLS, two 
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consumption rates at the sea base, and two shuttle ship alternatives.  Sustainment 
requirements and sea base safety stock levels are determined and compared for twelve 
different cases.  The scenarios are analyzed to investigate the feasibility of each possible 
alternative in meeting resupply requirements and the number of each ship required to 




III. MODEL AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
By considering initial MPF ship inventories, consumption rates of supplies, and 
threshold safety stock limits for a MEB-sized force structure, this model monitors sea 
base inventories and compares the capabilities of the resupply alternatives to maintain 
required consumable levels at the sea base.  The analysis determines the number of ships 
of each type that are required to maintain sea base inventory above Marine Corps safety 
levels. 
 
B. SCENARIO SPECIFICS 
In order to fully evaluate the resupply ship alternatives, three different geographic 
scenarios were developed.  The model scenarios were chosen to reflect a realistic range in 
sea base to FLS distances, but they also reflect a likelihood of future areas of operations.  
The first scenario is the area of Davao, a city on Mindanao, the southernmost island in the 
Philippines.  Mindanao has recently been recognized as an area of concern for possible 
terrorist activity in the United States’ War on Terrorism.  The FLS for the scenario is the 
U.S. Naval Station on Guam, approximately 1500 nautical miles (nm) due east. 
The second scenario simulates a sea base in the northern Gulf of Oman in support 
of combat operations in southern Iran.  This scenario is similar to the one used by 
Christopher M. Frey in September 2000 for his Operations Research thesis “An 
Evaluation of Sea-Based Sustainment of Forces” [Ref 9].  The sea base is located 
southwest of the Iranian city of Gevan.  The Forward Logistics Site for this scenario is 
Diego Garcia, about 2500 nm to the south. 
The third hotspot is Lagos, Nigeria where the U.S. has considerable petroleum 
interests within a very dynamic political environment.  The FLS for the scenario is Rota, 




C. SEA BASE REPLENISHMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The sea base replenishment requirements are computed from a standard rate and a 
surge rate representing the daily resupply requirements of a MEB-sized operation ashore.  
The standard consumption rate is based upon Center for Naval Analyses data [Ref 14], 
with an additional allowance made in the model to provide for a higher surge rate, 
reflecting the increased level of supplies needed during intense combat operations.  This 
surge rate adds 25% higher ordnance usage and 50% higher fuel usage.  The increased 
fuel rate would be a product of additional troop and rolling stock movements and 
logistics sorties accompanying the higher intensity operations.  Both the standard and 
surge consumption data are reflected in Table 1. 
Commodity Standard Rate  
(tons per day) 
Surge Rate  
(tons per day) 
Provisions 95 95 
Ordnance 550 687.50 
Fuel 1063 1595 
   
Table 1.   Sea Base Replenishment Requirement Data. 
 
D. SEA BASE INVENTORIES 
Extensive research by CNA analysts [Ref 15] has resulted in a proposed loadout 
of MPF(F) vessels for the future sea base.  These ships of the prepositioned squadron 
arrive in theater with enough equipment and supplies onboard to sustain a MEB-sized 
force for approximately 30 days [Ref 5].  Table 2 displays the proposed inventory data 
and the number of sustainment days the MPF(F) (composed of five ships) brings into the 
operational area based upon the consumption rates contained in Table 1.  As is shown, 
only one of the three commodities meets or exceeds the 30-day estimate for the standard 
consumption rate and none for the surge rate. 
Number of Sustainment Days Commodity Proposed MPF(F) 
Capacity Standard Surge 
Provisions 2,344 tons 25 25 
Ordnance 14,850 tons 27 22 
Fuel 270,000 bbl/39,690 tons 37 25 
    




The CNA-proposed fuel capacity is listed in barrels (bbls); however, since the other 
commodity inventories and consumption rates are measured in tons, all model 
calculations and all other tables will account for fuel in tons vice barrels.   
 
E. SAFETY STOCK LEVELS 
The shuttle ship alternatives will attempt to maintain sea base inventories above 
the predetermined amounts of provisions, fuel, and ammunition that constitute the safety 
stock level, also called the theater safety level.  The safety stock level is determined by 
the Unified Commander and is usually set at 15 days of supply (DOS) [Ref 16].  In the 
absence of guidance from the Unified Commander, the MAGTF’s Logistics Support 
Concept requires that a 15 DOS safety level be maintained.  However, there are occasions 
when it may be acceptable to go below 15 DOS.  If the FLS and a supporting CLF-type 
system is in place within the theater of operations, the 15 DOS requirement can be spread 
across the MPF-CLF-FLS, with the MPF/sea base having 10 DOS as a safety level.  For 
the purpose of this model, the 10 and 15 DOS requirements are easily translated into sea 
base commodity percentages based upon initial inventories and sea base consumption 
rates as shown in Tables 3 and 4.   
 
 Standard Consumption Rate 





Tons Percent of 
Inventory 
Provisions 95 950 40.53% 1,425 60.79% 
Ordnance 550 5,500 37.04% 8,250 55.56% 
Fuel 1063 10,630 26.79% 15,945 40.18% 
 










 Surge Consumption Rate 
10 Days of Supply 15 Days of Supply Commodity Daily 
Requirement 
(tons/day) Tons  Percent of Inventory 
Tons  Percent of 
Inventory 
Provisions 95 950 40.53% 1,425 60.79% 
Ordnance 687.5 6,875 46.30% 10,312.5 69.44% 
Fuel 1,595 15,947 40.18% 23,925 60.27% 
 
Table 4.   Safety Stock Levels for Surge Consumption Rate. 
 
The commodity percentages tracked at the sea base will be a factor of the initial 
inventory brought into theater by the MPF ships.  The resupply shuttle alternatives will 
be evaluated as to how effectively each option is able to maintain required safety stock 
levels.  
 
F. RESUPPLY SHUTTLE ALTERNATIVES 
The resupply shuttle variable also consists of two possibilities and the number 
required of each alternative to maintain required inventory levels.  The first possibility is 
a T-AKE and T-AO combination.  The T-AKE is a new two-product class of CLF ship 
that will replace current T-AFS (fast combat stores ship) and T-AE (ammunition ship) 
assets.  The T-AKE, as designed, will carry stores and ordnance.  It will also have a 
limited cargo fuel capacity.  Construction on the first ships of the T-AKE class will begin 
in 2003 at the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in San Diego, CA.  
Delivery of the first ship is scheduled for 2005.  The planned inventory of 12 T-AKEs 
will be sufficient to service carrier battle groups only.  The T-AO (fleet oiler) is an 
existing, proven fleet asset with many years of service life remaining. 
The second possibility for the shuttle variable is an MPF variant.  The MPF 
variant shuttles would actually be ships of the prepositioned squadron, which would 
assume resupply responsibilities after their initial offload of equipment and supplies.  
Those ships that are designated as shuttle ships would not contain any of the afloat 
command and control, medical, or intermediate repair facilities of the sea base.  This 
option would require extra analysis by Marine Corps planners on whether the sea base 
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can support the loss of potential aircraft landing spots and well decks, if so equipped, for 
periods when the shuttle ships return to the FLS for resupply.   
The proposed MPF variant dry cargo capacity is based upon current MPF ship 
deck space and design [Ref 17, 18, and 19].  After the ships offload their rolling stock 
and initial supply of containers, there is a vast abundance of empty deck space.  Table 5 
provides the container capacity numbers for prepositioning ships STOCKHAM (T-AK 
3017), MARTIN (T-AK 3015), and BOBO (T-AK 3008), resulting from the available 
empty space.  By allowing 160 square feet per container (eight feet wide by twenty feet 
long) with a 50% stow factor within available deck space and a 25% reload factor for 
initial container storage areas, an average capacity of 848 containers is assumed per MPF 
shuttle.  
 STOCKHAM MARTIN BOBO 
Deck Space Storage Capacity 
Available Space (sqft) 300,826  199,547  181,185  
TEU Capacity 1,880  1,247  1,132  
50% Factor  940  624  566 
Organic Container Storage Capacity 
Weather Deck 110  309  120  
25% Factor  28  77  30 
Enclosed Cargo 715  426  457  
25% Factor  179  107  114 
       
Total TEU  1147  808  710 
       
 Average TEU Capacity 848 
       
Table 5.   MPF Container Calculation. 
 
The reduced percentage stow factors mean that approximately half of available deck 
space will be utilized for container stowage.  This leaves large amounts of space for cargo 
handling and unstuffing containers en route to the sea base in preparation for selective 
offload of equipment and supplies.  These proposed cargo handling evolutions would 
present a manpower problem for the minimally manned crew of the MPF ships.  The 
current crew size of 25 to 30 government-contracted merchant mariners would need to be 
increased in size or possibly augmented by MEB Combat Service Support Element 




Because of the number of possibilities involved in sustaining the sea base, the 
following assumptions are made to make the model more manageable: 
1. Sea Base Assumptions  
· All ships of the sea base are equipped with the Expeditionary Logistics 
(ExLog) Heavy UNREP system that is currently under development.  This 
system will enable the ships to receive 12,000 lbs by connected 
replenishment. 
· Resupply shuttles will be capable of traveling approximately 500 nautical 
miles per day, which equates to a sustained speed of 20 to 21 knots. 
· In cases involving the MPF variant shuttles, it is assumed that the 
remaining MPF(F) ships at the sea base will be able to receive amounts of 
provisions and ordnance greater than the initial inventory levels onboard 
each ship.  This will allow the sea base ships to overcome the loss of one 
or two ships’ worth of commodities.  These inventory increases are 
assumed to be allowable due to excess cargo space that becomes available 
after the partial offload of rolling stock and supplies.  Table 6 provides the 
revised onboard commodity inventories per ship for a four-ship sea base 
(one ship as resupply shuttle) and a three-ship sea base (two ships as 
resupply shuttles).  The “Four Ships at the Sea Base“ and “Three Ships at 
the Sea Base” columns reflect approximately 25% and 67% increases in 
inventory, respectively. 
“Per-Ship” Inventory (tons) Commodity Initial 
Inventory 
Levels 
Five Ships at Sea 
Base 
Four Ships at Sea 
Base 
Three Ships at Sea 
Base 
Provisions 2,344 470 586 780 
Ordnance 14,850 2,970 3,713 4950 
       
Table 6.   Increased MPF(F) Commodity Capacities. 
 
· Without the increased storage capacity on non-shuttle MPF ships, the 
percentage of onboard stock that equates to the safe ty stock requirements 
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greatly increase as the number of MPF shuttle ships increases.  
Considering the 15- and 10-DOS data from Table 3 and the “Five Ships at 
the Sea Base” initial shipboard inventory levels from Table 6, inventory 
percentages are listed in Table 7 that reflect safety stock levels with a 
reduced number of sea base ships. 
Safety Stock Levels Percent of Inventory 
Five Ships at Sea Base Four Ships at Sea Base Three Ships at Sea Base 
Commodity 
15-DOS 10-DOS 15-DOS 10-DOS 15-DOS 10-DOS 
Provisions 60.79% 40.53% 75.99% 50.66% 101.32% 67.55% 
Ordnance 55.56% 37.04% 69.44% 46.30% 92.59% 61.73% 
       
Table 7.   Safety Stock Levels Percentage of Inventory 
 
· Due to initial excess inventory of fuel within the MPF(F) ships, there is no 
need to attempt to increase onboard storage capacity. 
 
2. T-AKE and T-AO Assumptions  
· Both T-AKE and T-AO ships will be at the sea base and available for 
resupply evolutions upon commencement of operations. 
· Based upon the CNA-proposed MPF(F) loadout contained in Table 2, it is 
assumed that 14% of the dry cargo at the sea base will be provisions, and 
86% will be ammunition.  Correspondingly, the T-AKE dry cargo loadout 
will reflect these same percentages.  With a total dry cargo capacity of 
5,910 tons, 830 tons will be allocated for provisions and 5,080 tons for 
ammunition. 
· The T-AO fuel capacity is 26,166 tons (178,000 bbls).  The T-AKE cargo 
fuel capacity is 2,646 tons (18,000 bbls). 
 
3. MPF Variant Assumptions  
· MPF variant shuttle ships will be sized and configured to receive, hand le, 
and unstuff twenty-foot containers. 
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· The dry cargo relationship between provisions and ordnance onboard the 
MPF shuttle will be the same as the T-AKE loadout, 14% provisions and 
86% ordnance.  This results in 2,500 tons of provisions and 15,360 tons of 
ordnance when the MPF shuttle is completely loaded with 848 containers.  
Table 8 containers the container and tonnage calculations. 
Commodity Tons Tons per TEU Number of TEUs 
Provisions  2,500 12 208 
Ordnance 15,360 24 640 
Totals 17,860  848 
    
Table 8.   MPF TEU Calculations  
 
· In order to provide a more effective shuttle capability for refueling 
operations, the proposed MPF(F) onboard supply of approximately 7,940 
tons of fuel will be increased to 12,500 tons for the designated MPF 
shuttles.  This capacity of cargo fuel will enable the MPF variant shuttles 
to provide a complete refueling to the non-shuttle MPF ships following a 
resupply transit to the furthermost FLS.  
· The 848-container capacity for the MPF variant is based strictly on 
available deck space without regard to tonnage restrictions.  The Fast 
Sealift Ship (FSS) of the Military Sealift Command is 950 feet long and 
can carry approximately 25,500 tons of cargo.  With a combined cargo and 
fuel capacity of approximately 30,500 tons, the MPF shuttle variant may 
result in a ship too large to be feasible for naval planners. 
· Those ships of the MPF squadron that are designated as the shuttle ships 
will be optimally configured to offload first.  It is estimated that the MPF 
shuttle ships would initially contain three days worth of sustainment.  
Following the offload of equipment and supplies at the sea base, the 
shuttle ship will convert to its resupply role.  For cases involving two 
shuttle ships, the second ship will provide sustainment for the second 
three-day period and then depart for the FLS in its resupply role.   
Cargo capacity assumptions for all three resupply ships are listed in Table 9. 
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Commodity T-AKE T-AO MPF Variant 
Provisions 830 tons N/A 2,500 tons 
Ordnance 5,080 tons N/A 15,360 tons 
Fuel 2,646 tons 26,166 tons 12,500 tons 
 
Table 9.   Shuttle Ship Alternatives Consumable Capacities after Ref. [20] for T-AKE 
and after Ref. [21] for T-AO. 
 
4. FLS Assumptions  
· The flow of cargo towards the sea base will be routed through a forward 
logistics site for transfer to one of the resupply alternatives.  For the cases 
involving the T-AKE alternative, containers will be unstuffed at the FLS 
with palletized cargo loaded onboard the shuttle ship.  For the MPF 
variant, containers will probably be offloaded from the commercial 
container ship to a holding area and then transferred to the shuttle ship.   
· There is no disruption or delay in the flow of cargo to the FLS.  Whenever 
a resupply shuttle arrives for onload, the required amounts of all 
commodities are available. 
· Cargo transfer rates for the FLS are listed in Table 10. 
T-AKE & TAO Combination MPF Variant 
Pallets 20 pallets per hour per station Containers 15 containers per hour per crane 
Fuel 440 tons per hour per hose Fuel 440 tons per hour per hose 
 
Table 10.   FLS Cargo Transfer Rates. 
 
· Two pallet-receiving stations on the T-AKE will result in 40 pallets per 
hour total [Ref 22]. 
· Two fuel-receiving hoses on the T-AO and MPF shuttles provide a total 
refuel rate of 880 tons per hour [Ref 22].  T-AKE cargo fuel evolutions 
will use a single hose, which will result in a refuel rate of 440 tons per 
hour.  
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· An MPF container rate of 15 containers per hour at the FLS is based upon 
a transfer of 30 containers per hour under ideal circumstances in an 
improved container transfer facility [Ref 23].  The model assumes that the 
average container weight for provisions and ammunition are 12 tons and 
24 tons, respectively.  
· Based upon the ships’ cargo capacities listed in Table 6 and the cargo 
transfer rates listed in Table 7, the maximum load time per vessel at the 
FLS is: 
· T-AKE: 74 hours 
· T-AO: 30 hours 
· MPF: 49 hours 
 
H. MODEL FORMULATION 
The Sea Base Inventory and Resupply Model is stated mathematically as follows: 
 
1. Indices 
t  Sea base day  (0,1,2,…90) 
k  Commodity (Provisions, Ammo, Fuel) 
r  Commodity Consumption Rate (Standard, Surge) 
s  Shuttle alternative (T-AKE, T-AO, MPF) 
n  Number of MPF resupply shuttles (1,2) 
m  MPF ships in MPSRON (1,2,3,4,5) 
d  FLS-to-sea base distance (1500, 2500, 3500) 
 
2. Data 
spdShuttle Speed of resupply shuttle (nm/day) 
totalMPF Total number of MPF ships in MPSRON 
capSBk Sea base capacity of commodity k (tons) 
invSBt,k Sea base inventory of commodity k on day t (tons) 
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capMPFk,m Capacity of commodity k on MPF ship m (tons) 
15DOSk,m Percentage of onboard stocks that equate to 15-DOS level (%) 
dailyk,r  Daily requirement of commodity k for rate r (tons) 
capShuttles,k Capacity of commodity k on shuttle s (tons) 
invShuttles,k,t Amount of commodity k on shuttle s on day t (tons) 
numShuttlen Number of MPF variant shuttles   
resupSBk,s,t Amount of resupply to the sea base of commodity k from shuttle s on day t 
(tons) 
resupFLSk,s,t Amount of resupply onloaded on shuttle s at the FLS of commodity k on 
day t (tons) 
transitFLSs,d Transit time for shuttle s with scenario distance d to replenish and return 
to sea base (hours) 
distFLSd Distance from the sea base to the FLS (nm) 
flsOnldRatek  Shuttle onload rate of commodity k at the FLS (tons/hour) 
 
3. Formulation and Narrative  
The Sea Base Inventory and Resupply Model starts with an MPSRON at 
maximum capacity of provisions, ammunition, and fuel, as listed in Table 2.  As 
operations commence, inventory for the three commodities are decremented daily in 
accordance with the consumption rate that is in effect (Table 1) to represent the flow of 
supplies to Marines ashore.  The inventories continue to decrease until resources are 
expended or until a resupply of commodities is delivered to the sea base ships. 
 
Sea Base Commodity Inventory (tons) 









The goal of the assigned resupply ships in each case is to provide replenishment 
to the sea base ships prior to the commodities inventories decreasing to the 15-DOS level.  
Safety stock level inventories are listed in Table 3 for standard consumption and Table 4 
for surge consumption. 
 
Sea Base Inventory Constraint (tons) 
invSBt,k ³  15 * daily k,r     rkt ,,"  
 
Resupply ship inventories are monitored in order to determine when return trips to 
the FLS are required.  Shuttle ship capacities are listed in Table 9. 
 
Shuttle Ship Inventory (tons) 
invShuttlek,s,t = invShuttlek,s,t -  resupk,s,t + resupFLSk,s,t tsk ,,"  
 
When it is time for the resupply shuttle to transit to the FLS for replenishment, 
total time away from the sea base is a function of sea base-to-FLS distance and the time 
required for onload at the FLS.  Commodity onload rates are listed in Table 10. 
 
Shuttle FLS Transit Time (hours) 
transitFLSs,d = 2 * (distFLSd / spdShuttle) + ((capShuttle s,k - invShuttlet,k) / onloadRatek)  
dtsk ,,,"
 
In cases involving the MPF variant shuttles, the remaining MPF(F) ships at the 
sea base must be able to receive amounts of provisions and ordnance greater than the 
initial inventory levels onboard each ship to account for the n ships’ worth of 
commodities, where n is the number of MPF resupply shuttles.  These inventory 
increases are assumed to be allowable due to excess cargo space that becomes available 
after the partial offload of rolling stock and supplies.  The data in Table 6 refers. 
 
MPF Ship Increased Inventory (tons) 





Without the increased storage capacity on non-shuttle MPF ships, the percentage 
of onboard stock that equates to the safety stock requirements greatly increase as the 
number of MPF shuttle ships increases.  Table 7 displays the commodity percentages 
required to maintain 15-DOS at the sea base. 
 
Increased Inventory Equivalent to 15-DOS (%) 
15DOSk,m = (dailyk,r * 15) / capSBk / (totMPF - numShuttlen)  nmrk ,,,"  
 
The equations contained in this section are used to produce the inventory level 
































IV. MODEL FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
A. MODEL OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a synopsis of model results for the Sea Base Inventory and 
Resupply Model.  This model evaluated twelve different cases from the three geographic 
sea base scenarios.  The sea base in each scenario consists of one five-ship MPSRON, 
which is logistically supporting a MEB-sized operation ashore.  The variables that 
produced the twelve cases were: (1) three sea base-to-FLS distances, (2) two sea base 
commodity consumption rates, and the (3) two types of shuttle ship alternatives.  Each 
case was analyzed as to the number of shuttle ship alternatives were able to maintain the 
sea base inventories of provisions, ordnance, and fuel within Marine Corps theater safety 
stock levels.   
The theater safety stock level is typically set at 15 days of supply (DOS) required 
to be maintained at the sea base; however, there is a provision for easing this requirement 
to 10 days of supply if the FLS and a supporting CLF-type system is in place within the 
theater of operations.  Since there is relevance in tracking both safety stock levels, the 
model monitors how well the resupply alternatives perform with regards to both 15-DOS 
and 10-DOS requirements. 
 
B. THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SCENARIO 
The Philippines scenario, with the shortest transit distance to the FLS, presents the 
least challenging situation for the two resupply alternatives.  However, even at this 
elementary stage of the model, significant differences are apparent between the T-AKE 
and T-AO combination and the MPF variant.   
As Figures 2 and 3 display, there is no considerable advantage to having two MPF 
variant shuttles with a standard consumption rate at this short distance.  Both of these 
cases encounter one day when the provisions inventory drops to the 15-DOS requirement, 





















































































Figures 2 and 3 also display how the sea base fuel inventory is affected by the 
initial departure of the MPF shuttle ships.  The first three days of the one-shuttle ship 
scenarios and the first six days of the two-shuttle ship scenarios include the initial fuel 
stocks of the MPF shuttle ships in the sea base inventories.  However, after the shuttle 
ships convert to their resupply responsibilities, those stocks are no longer counted as part 
of the sea base.  This results in the inability of the sea base to return to its complete, 
initial capacity.  This affect does not apply to provision and ammunition stocks due to the 
assumption of increased storage space onboard the non-shuttle MPF ships following 
equipment offload.  This assumption is explained in Chapter III, Section G. 
The advantage of a second shuttle is demonstrated under the surge consumption 
rate variable.  The single MPF shuttle results in considerable time during which the 
inventory is below the 15-DOS level.  Ordnance and fuel percentages provide the most 
glaring deficiency with 32 days and 41 days of the 90-day period, respectively, with 


































When two MPF shuttles are applied to the case, a single four-day period is noted 
with ordnance supplies less than the 15-DOS level (Figure 5).  The fuel stocks presents a 
much worse situation with sea base supplies never climbing above 15-DOS following the 
initial inventories; however, stocks do not drops below 10-DOS.  The loss of two ships’ 
worth of fuel inventory at the sea base is too much for the shuttle ships to overcome.  If 












Figure 5.   Philippines, MPF Variant, Two Ships, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
Figures 6 and 7 reveal serious provisioning and ordnance problems with a single 
T-AKE supporting the sea base.  Under standard consumption rates, ordnance is below 
the 15-DOS level for 45 days of the model period.  Additionally, ordnance levels are 
below 15-DOS for 80 days of the evaluation period when surge consumption rates are 
implemented.  The T-AO is generally able to maintain fuel percentages (except for a 
single three-day period of inventory less than 10-DOS); however the T-AKE is unable to 























































































In the two T-AKE case, the resupply ships are able to maintain commodity levels 
with standard consumption (Figure 8) with no drops in inventory below theater stock 
levels, but surge-rate levels are again a problem with several occasions of ordnance and 
fuel inventories falling below 15-DOS (Figure 9), although the occasions are only one-
third as severe as in the single T-AKE case.  There are no inventory observations below 
































































Figure 9.   Philippines, Two T-AKEs & One T-AO, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
For the Philippine Islands scenario, it becomes apparent that a single MPF variant 
shuttle or two T-AKEs combined with a T-AO are very capable of maintaining 
commodity levels under standard consumption rates; however, in order to maintain surge-
rate levels for this easiest scenario, two MPF shuttles or three T-AKEs (Figure 10) are 























































C. THE IRANIAN SCENARIO 
While a single MPF shuttle was able to satisfactorily sustain the Philippine 
standard- consumption sea base, significant 15-DOS provision and ordnance deficiencies 
are observed for the Iranian sea base using the same resupply configuration (Figure 11).  
Provision supplies decrease below the 10-DOS level for one day in this case, while both 


































Figure 11.   Iran, MPF Variant, One Ship, Standard Consumption Rate 
 
In the case of surge consumption (Figure 12), all three commodity stocks spend 
long periods of time below 15-DOS.  Additionally, fuel levels exhibit an unrecoverable , 










Figure 12.   Iran, MPF Variant, One Ship, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
Two MPF ships drastically decrease the number of deficient days for standard 








































14) still results in sustained fuel inventory at or below the 15-DOS level, including 12 










































































Based upon the difficulty of one T-AKE in maintaining inventories at the 1500 
nm distance, this case was not evaluated for the longer FLS distances, as its fur ther 
deficiencies are obvious.   
The combination of two T-AKEs and one T-AO satisfactorily meets standard 
consumption requirements (Figure 15), but it is gravely deficient in surge ordnance at the 
15-DOS level (Figure 16).  Two separate two-day periods were observed where ordnance 










































































Figure 16.   Iran, Two T-AKEs & One T-AO, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
As displayed in the graphs for the Iranian scenario, two MPF variant shuttles are 
unable to maintain surge requirements above 15-DOS levels, exhibiting significant 
inventory deficiencies in fuel.  Regarding the T-AKE cargo alternative, two ships are able 
to maintain standard consumption levels; however, similar to the Philippine Islands 
scenario, three T-AKEs are required to fully maintain commodity levels above 15-DOS 






































Figure 17.   Iran, Three T-AKEs & One T-AO, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
D. THE NIGERIAN SCENARIO 
The Nigerian sea base scenario presents the most challenging cases for the 
resupply shuttles.  The FLS distance of 3,500 nm results in shuttle ships being away from 
the sea base for 16 to 17 days for resupply.  This is far too much for a single MPF shuttle 
to overcome for even the lower standard consumption rate.  For the two MPF shuttle case 
using both standard and surge rates (Figures 18 and 19), all three commodities drop 
significantly below the 10-DOS requirement during the shuttles’ transition to resupply 
duties.  The extreme amount of decrease, in addition to the follow-on fuel difficulties, 
























































































Except for two separate two-day periods, two T-AKEs and one T-AO are able to 
maintain all standard-rate commodities for the 90-day period; however, the T-AKEs 



















Figure 21 demonstrates the surge-rate ordnance shortcomings of two T-AKEs and 
one T-AO in this difficult scenario.  The limited cargo capacity of the T-AKEs, as 
compared to the MPF variant, is not able to overcome the extreme transit distances to the 










































Adding a third T-AKE and a second T-AO to the scenario drastically improve the 
surge-rate commodity levels.  As shown in Figure 22, provisions, ordnance and fuel stock 























































Figure 22.   Nigeria, Three T-AKEs & Two T-AOs, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
 
A resupply system combining the two shuttle alternatives was analyzed.  Figure 
23 displays the commodity levels that are sustained by a combination of one MPF 
variant, one T-AKE, and one T-AO while expending supplies at the surge consumption 
rate.   
The MPF variant adds approximately one-half of a T-AO-equivalent of fuel to the 
resupply system, in addition to the equivalent of three T-AKE’s worth of provisions and 
ordnance.  As is seen in Figure 23, fuel levels are no longer an issue, but the MPF and T-
AKE combination does not perform as well as three T-AKEs for provisions and 
ammunition sustainment.  This is due to the gaps in resupply ship presence at the sea base 
because of the 3500 nm transit distance.  Three resupply ships provide more consistent 
presence at the sea base than two ships, even though one of the two ships is the much 












































Figure 23.   Nigeria, One MPF & One T-AKE & One T-AO, Surge Consumption Rate 
 
 
E. GENERAL FINDINGS 
While the resupply system of two MPF variant shuttles is able to maintain long-
term standard-consumption sustainment in most cases with minimal difficulty, inventory 
problems exist in most cases involving surge consumption requirements.  Additionally, 
recurring deficiencies of all three commodities are observed after the shuttle ships have 
offloaded their initial three-day sustainment supply at the sea base and transit to the FLS 
for the first resupply evolution.   
The large capacity of the MPF shuttle results in a superior cargo handling 
advantage over the T-AKE/T-AO combination.  The ability to receive twenty-foot 
containers at the FLS coupled with the increased size enable the MPF shuttle to onload 
three times the dry cargo of the T-AKE in one-third less time.  Considering the FLS load 
rates stated in Chapter III, the T-AKE will take three days to completely reload with 






















Beginning with the 2500 nm scenario, two T-AKEs experience great difficulty 
maintaining ammunition levels.  While the two-T-AKE/T-AO combination is able to 
sustain food and fuel with some difficulty, three T-AKEs are required to keep up with 
surge ammunition expenditure rates. 
 
F. RESUPPLY ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE SYNOPSIS 
In order to evaluate one resupply alternative against another, Table 11 provides a 
synopsis of how each shuttle performed within each scenario.  As a standardized scoring 
convention, categorical grades of “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” are be assigned for 
performance in sustaining each commodity based upon the following criteria: 
· A score of “Good” will be assigned if the resupply alternative is able to 
fully maintain sea base commodities above all theater safety stock levels, 
or any occasional decreases in inventory below 15-DOS for no more than 
four days. 
· A system will be graded as “Fair” if it is able to adequately maintain levels 
with occasional periods of inventory below 15-DOS for no more than 6 
days or below 10-DOS for no more than 2 days. 
· “Poor” systems will be those that consistently maintain inventories within 
the 15- or 10-DOS levels, or those that reflect an overall downward trend 
in commodity inventory.    
· A grade of “Fair/Good” or “Poor/Good” may apply for MPF variant cases 
reflecting a score for the initial decrease in inventory while the ship reverts 
to its shuttle responsibilities and a separate score to reflect the shuttles 
ability to sustain long-term inventories. 




Commodities Scenario Resupply Alternative 
Provisions  Ordnance Fuel 
Standard Good Good Good One MPF 
Variant Surge Good Fair Poor 
Standard Good Good Good Two MPF 
Variant Surge Good Good Poor 
Standard Poor Poor Good One T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge Poor Poor Fair 
Standard Good Good Good Two T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge Good Fair Good 







& One T-AO Surge Good Good Good 
Standard Fair Good Good One MPF 
Variant Surge Poor Poor Poor 
Standard Fair/Good Fair/Good Good Two MPF 
Variant Surge Fair/Good Poor/Good Poor 
Standard NA NA NA One T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge NA NA NA 
Standard Good Good Good Two T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge Good Poor Good 







& One T-AO Surge Good Good Good 
Standard Poor Fair Good One MPF 
Variant Surge Poor Poor Poor 
Standard Fair/Good Poor/Good Fair Two MPF 
Variant Surge Fair/Good Poor/Fair Poor 
Standard NA NA NA One T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge NA NA NA 
Standard Good Poor Good Two T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge Good Poor Poor 
Standard Good Good Good Three T-AKE 
& One T-AO Surge Good Good Good 








& One T-AO 
Surge Good Good Good 
      






This thesis has established the need for replenishment to occur at the sea base to 
prevent commodities inventories from being reduced below theater safety stock levels; 
furthermore, it was established that no existing system is capable of fulfilling this 
requirement.  Two possible alternatives to meet the resupply requirement were introduced 
and analyzed.   
In order to analyze alternative resupply shuttles that will be used to deliver 
sustainment supplies from the FLS to the sea base in future OMFTS-style amphibious 
operations, this thesis has developed the Sea Base Inventory and Resupply Model.  This 
analysis is built upon three different geographic scenarios and incorporates proposed 
MPF(F) cargo inventories, expected rates of commodity consumption, and different 
resupply ship possibilities.  This comparison and evaluation of the two alternatives 
provides an indication of how an analysis could be conducted for any further resupply 
possibilities that should arise. 
Table 11 in Chapter IV is a compilation of how each resupply alternative 
performed with regards to maintaining safety stock levels.  From the model analysis, 
several enlightening observations may be made regarding the type of logistics support 
and resupply system that will be required to sustain sea-based Marine Corps forces.   
· Significant design factors and overall sea base inventory issues could 
adversely impact the ability of MPF(F) ships to serve as resupply shuttles.  
While their size is definitely a benefit, the sea base may not be able to 
handle the loss of warehouse space and on-station inventory.   
· Assuming that the design issues can be overcome, two pre-designated and 
pre-configured MPF ships can effectively serve as shuttle ships; however, 
the major logistics hurdle within this option is the initial drop in sea base 
commodity inventories while the MPF ship converts to its shuttle mission 
and makes its first resupply run back to the FLS.  This may be overcome 
by increased initial MPF(F) inventories, or by possibly teaming one T-
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AKE with each MPSRON, similar to the case depicted by Figure 23 in 
Chapter IV.   
· Based upon the current T-AKE design, three T-AKE ships would be 
required to sustain the provision and ammunition requirements of the sea 
base.  Subject to the ability to procure sufficient numbers of T-AKE ships 
to support future MPF force requirements, the T-AKE/T-AO alternative 
may be the more attractive of the two possibilities considered. 
· Logistics throughput time savings are realized by the containerization of 
supplies if the shuttle ships have the manning required to unstuff the 
containers and palletize the cargo. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
The Sea Base Inventory and Resupply Model used in this thesis is deterministic in 
nature.  In order to provide more realism to the scenarios, some amount of randomness 
could be introduced into several of the model’s variables (e.g. consumption rates, reload 
times at the FLS, and transit times).  Additionally, the model could be expanded to 
include other logistics support items which would likely flow into theater as part of 
indefinite sustainment, such as spare parts and replacement rolling stock.  These 
modifications to the current model may provide a more detailed and robust analysis of the 
FLS-to-sea base phase of the factory-to-foxhole network, which was described in Chapter 
II. 
A joint aspect can be introduced with the addition of U.S. Army logistics 
requirements.  This would lend itself to longer operations ashore, which may or may not 
be supported from a sea base. 
 
In addition to this and any future FLS-to-Sea Base studies, the first two phases of 
the resupply network will require analysis as to how USTRANSCOM will support sea 
base operations from CONUS.  Containerization, in- transit visibility, and the ability to 
rapidly activate the sea base logistics support network will be necessary hurdles to 
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overcome prior to the full operational implementation of Operational Maneuver From the 
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